Skip to content
Agent Forge Docs

Privilege escalation is rarely fixed by adding an approval console

Adding an approval UI after an incident only gates paths wired into that UI. If HTTP roles can be forged, tools default to fully open, and external directories have no rules, the console is decoration. The root cause is the permission model and identity binding—not whether a todo list exists.

Three things that must hold together

Section titled “Three things that must hold together”
  1. Role RBAC: who may call governance and config APIs (admin / operator / approver / readonly)
  2. Tool rules: the set the model may see and execute (allow / deny / ask), escalating to HITL when needed
  3. Identity binding: tenant and role come from server-side mapping; forged headers are ignored
flowchart TD
  Id[Identity binding] --> RBAC[Route RBAC]
  RBAC --> Tools[Tool permission]
  Tools --> Hitl[HITL optional]

Detail: RBAC, identity binding, HITL, config and permission.

Related reading: